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Ethnic and Age Differences 
Reduce Political Discussion
by Leo W. Jeff res, Jae-won Lee, Guowei Jian, Sukki Yoon 
and David J. Atkin
A survey of U.S. households finds people involved in 
neighborhood communication networks are more likely 
to engage in political discussions, and the likelihood is 
greater among people with higher levels of education but 
lower among those with greater ethnic or age diversity.
TJL he proliferation of new media is heightening political polarization,1 with 
declining newspaper circulation prompting newspaper fire-sales that attract 
billionaire investors like Jeff Bezos (Washington Post) and the Hunt brothers. 
The Post's acquisition by one of America's top retailers—which spends billions 
annually trying to influence tax reform, cyber security and federal contracting— 
could influence political issues in which it has a financial interest. These politi-
cal dynamics assume critical importance in today's multimedia environment, 
given that America is becoming more diverse and the vibrancy of democracy 
is contingent on an active, well-versed electorate.
Generally, political communication research focuses on the significance of 
public discussion for people's opinions of political decisions, often fed by what 
they learn from the media and their political activity. Habermas2 defines the 
public sphere as a social dimension in which rational and civil political discus-
sion could lead to an informed public. He traced the growth of a public sphere 
in the 17th and 18th centuries—along with its eventual decline during the 20th 
century—noting that recent generations exhibited little interest or discussion 
concerning civic matters.
Jeffres is a professor, Lee is a professor and Jian is an associate professor. All are in 
the School of Communication at Cleveland State University. Yoon is an associate 
professor in the Department of Marketing at Bryant University. Atkin is a professor in 
the Department of Communication at the University of Connecticut.
Research identifies the importance of interpersonal communication as well 
as attention to both traditional and new media for people's participation in 
political processes. The literature suggests that one's political network3 affects 
perceptions and behavior, and studies focusing on public opinion about public 
issues often measure people's political discussion networks.4 Those who discuss 
politics frequently in volunteer groups are more politically active5 and less likely 
to be affected by media content; 6 also, the diversity of one's network can affect 
political activity.7 Beck8 found that people were most likely to discuss politics 
with like-minded relatives and friends, but communication with coworkers 
provided an opportunity for dissonant messages to intrude.
Here factors that might influence the level of people's political discussion 
and involvement in a political discussion network are addressed. To begin, an 
individual's political communication network includes symbolic activity across 
contexts, from media use to discussions with family and friends and coworkers. 
Wellman and Tindall9 view each individual as the center of a unique social net-
work. First to be considered is the larger environment, the community context, 
its size and diversity; then, move to individual differences—social categories 
that include demographic factors (gender), achievement factors (education) 
and life cycle factors (age, marital status).
Background
Notwithstanding the broad spectrum of mediated and interpersonal chan-
nels available to voters today, research suggests that politics plays a relatively 
small part of people's lives, even during times of spirited campaigns. 10 The 
existing breadth of communication patterns—including legacy and emerging 
media-represent a baseline of influences or opportunities for communication 
about civic issues that are the more bounded behavior comprising the criterion 
variable: one's political discussion network.
Wyatt and his colleagues found that political discussion is most likely to 
occur in work and family contexts." The order of influences is problematic in 
one-shot studies because, while people's personal attributes and characteris-
tics influence where they choose to live, the choice of job and importance of 
relationships often trump environmental preferences. Huckfeldt and Sprague12 
note that people may choose their friends and have some control over their 
conversations, but these relationships are bounded by the environment. Size 
and diversity of the community have been identified as particularly important 
in the communication literature. 13
Over more than three decades, Tichenor14 and his colleagues tested the 
pluralistic model, which says that size leads to diversity and these factors have 
consequences for how the media operate. Recent evidence shows that overall 
community diversity is inversely related to individual involvement in a politi-
cal discussion network. 15 For instance, Jeffres, Atkin and Neuendorf16 found 
evidence of an opinion spiral effect, one in which white subjects were less likely
to
like themselves.18 This dynamic follows the logic of"Noelle-Neumann's19 Spiral 
of Silence model, which suggests that people are reticent to express themselves 
when they sense that they're in the minority within a given communication 
climate. Based on the assumption that perceived opposition can have a chilling 
effect on one's willingness to express oneself and that larger communities are 
more diverse, it was postulated that:
H1:
Community diversity will be inversely related to political discussion.
H2:
Population size will be inversely related to political discussion.
Once people are located in an environment, they face a communication 
climate-one based on respondent perception about public issues in their 
community—that may be more or less conducive to people's participation in 
civic dialogues. This may occur in variegated contexts—work, public areas, 
neighborhood—as well as in more formal public settings such as public meet-
ings. People's perception of the local climate for communication and their in-
volvement in that communication system should affect their comfort in voicing 
complaints in the public sphere.
It's useful to inquire whether the built environment is structured to encour-
age such political discussion by offering "third places" where political and, of 
course, other discussion can take place. "Third places," as defined by Olden-
burg and Brissett,20 are the "great, good places"21 that foster community and 
communication among people outside of home and work, the first and second 
places of daily life. Third places are the coffee shops and bars, barbershops and 
beauty salons, bowling alleys and recreation centers, senior centers and other 
public places where people meet, congregate and communicate.
Third places may thus take many forms and, while observers and scholars 
have written many essays on their form and their importance, research has yet 
to ascertain the public's perception of such spaces and whether their availability 
increases the prospects for stronger communication networks where people 
discuss politics and other civic matters. Oldenburg identifies essential charac-
teristics of third places that he believes engender the unique communication 
experiences and sociological benefits associated with them.22
As with the general political dynamics reviewed above, one's willingness 
to engage in political discussion in these and other contexts is influenced by 
social locators.
Based on the literature, perceived communication climate, existing com-
munication patterns and the perceived availability of third places should all
express their true feelings on affirmative action to a non-white pollster.
Although structural-level variables can lead to some inadvertent exposure to 
litically diverse views,17 people prefer to discuss politics with others who are
help to determine the size, frequency and diversity of one's political discussion 
network. Each of these relationships will be sequenced in the order stated for 
an overall test of the significance of relationships controlling for prior factors. 
More formally:
H3:
Perceived comfort with the communication climate will be positively related 
to political discussion.
H4:
Level of communication activity (e.g., newspaper readership) will be posi-
tively related to political discussion.
H5:
The perceived availability of "third places" will be positively related to 
political discussion.
Finally, one's willingness to engage in political discussion in these and other 
contexts is influenced by social locators. Wyatt and his colleagues link political 
communication patterns to such demographic predictors as education.23 Drawing 
from work underscoring the importance of social status in determining political 
activity by Tichenor and associates,24 one can posit that:
H6:
Educational attainment will be positively related to political discussion.
And finally, while scholars have long noted that men are more active in vari-
ous aspects of political activity, that gender gap began to narrow in the 1980s.25 
This dynamic may stem from the fact that men are socialized to be more politi-
cally active.26 Similarly, Putnam27 maintains that citizens born before 1945 were 
socialized to be more active in various community groups over time. Having 
accreted more such social capital, one would expect that older people would 
have larger, more active and diverse political discussion networks.28 Based on 
these socio-cultural dynamics, it is hypothesized that:
H7:
Male gender will be positively related to political discussion.
H8:
Age will be positively related to political discussion
The direction of influence with some social locators is difficult to establish 
over time. In fact, the few studies addressing marital status reveal contradictory 
influences on political discussion.29 This prompts the following:
RQ1:
How is marital status related to political discussion?
Method
A national telephone survey was conducted using a probability sample of 
U.S. households that yielded 477 respondents.30 The survey, introduced as the 
Civic Project, had a cooperation rate of 27 percent, comparable to that achieved 
by companion surveys of similar length (20 minutes). Interviews were conducted 
by students and employed interviewers supervised by faculty in the school's 
research center and include the following measures.
Social Categories
in
11.3 percent; 31-40, 14.3 percent; 41-50,23.1 percent; 51-60,19.4 percent; 61-70,
13.2 percent; 71 or older 15.5 percent; M = 4.4, SD = 1.7), gender (l=male, 47 
percent; 2=female, 53 percent; M=4.7, SD=2.2), level of education (M = 4.1, SD 
= 1.3; scale from 1 = less than high school to 6 = post graduate degree), ethnic/ 
culture / race (12.9 percent African American; 75.2 percent Caucasian; 3.5 percent 
Hispanic; 1.4 percent Asian; .7 percent American Indian; 2.3 percent mixed; 4 
percent other) and marital status (57.1 percent married, 11.6 percent divorced;
10.2 percent widowed; .9 percent separated; 20.2 percent never been married).
Community/Environmental Characteristics
Respondents were asked for the zip code in which they lived. This was 
matched with census data for the community population and the county popu-
lation. Then the zip code in which they lived was matched with occupational, 
ethnic, age, education, income and marital data to create measures of diversity. 
Population breakdowns were recorded by zip code for age, ethnicity, occupa-
tion, household income and marital status using the Census categories, e.g., the
Individual differences were measured using standard items for age (recorded 
seven categories coded 1 to 7, youngest to oldest: 18-20, 3.2 percent; 21-30,
percentage Caucasian, African American, Asian, Hispanic, American Indian, 
other ethnicity and mixed. Using Blau's formula for variance across categories, 
diversity measures were computed for each variable.31
P o lit ic a l D is c u s s io n  N e tw o rk
The criterion variable was measured using five items that capture the size, 
frequency and diversity of one's political discussion network, using items em-
ployed by many other scholars.32 
The three constituent variables— 
size of political discussion network, 
frequency of discussing politics 
and diversity of discussion part-
ners—will be examined separately 
as well as a whole. Frequency was 
measured with three items. For two 
items respondents were asked to use 
a 0-10 scale to tell how much they 
agreed with the following two state-
ments, 0 meaning they completely 
disagreed, 5 being neutral and 10 
meaning they completely agreed:
"I generally discuss political can-
didates and issues with neighbors 
at election time"(M = 4.1, SD =
3.4); "I generally discuss political 
candidates and issues with family 
and friends at election time" (M =
6.6, SD = 3.3) A third item asked 
respondents, "How many days in 
the past week did you engage in 
political discussion with friends and 
family.. .never (0), once (1), acouple 
times (2), almost every day (3), or 
several times a day (4)? (M = 1.6,
SD = 1.3). The responses to these three items were standardized and summed 
up for a scale (a =.68); the three items are strongly related, with correlations 
ranging from .36 to .49). Diversity of political discussion was measured with 
an item that asked, "How often do you discuss politics with people whose po-
litical views are different from yours-almost never (1), seldom (2), sometimes 
(3), or frequently (4)?" (M = 2.3, SD = 1.1). Size of one's political discussion 
network was measured with an item that asked, "About how many people 
do you discuss politics with on a regular basis...none (0), one (1), two or three 
(2), five to ten (3), or more than that (4)?" (coded so 0=none, l=one; 2=two or 
three; 3=five to ten; 4=more than that) (M = 1.7, SD = 1.2). The five items were
Political discussion is 
greater in communities 
with more educational but 
less ethnic or age diversity. 
So while ethnic and age 
diversity in a community 
increase the probability 
one will encounter people 
who don’t share those 
characteristics, they don’t 
lead to more political 
discussion.
standardized and summed up for an overall scale tapping involvement in a 
political discussion network (X = .71).
Perceived Communication Climate
Several items were used to obtain respondents' perceptions of the cli-
mate for communication about public issues in their community. Two asked 
respondents to use the same 0-10 scale to tell how much they agreed with the 
following two statements, one reflecting the individual's comfort in expressing 
themselves in formal public settings and the second reflecting their perception 
of the receptiveness with which such comments would be received by officials 
(with 0 meaning they completely disagreed, 5 was neutral and 10 meant they 
completely agreed): "I'd feel comfortable voicing a complaint at a public meeting 
in my community" (M = 6.3, SD = 3.4; std. error = .16); "Public officials in my 
community seem receptive to views of residents" (M = 5.9, SD = 2.9;std. error 
= .14). Three other items tapped an individual's comfort in talking about things 
with people across context: " How comfortable are you striking up a conver-
sation with a stranger on the street, very comfortable, somewhat comfortable, 
somewhat uncomfortable, or very comfortable? (coded so 4=very comfortable, 
3=somewhat comfortable; 2=somewhat uncomfortable; l=very uncomfortable) 
(M = 3.1, SD = 1.0; std. error = .04). This was followed by, "How about talking 
about politics, religion or other personal matters with your neighbors?" (M 
= 2.6, SD = 1.1; std. error = .05) and "How about talking about such personal 
things with people at work?" (M = 2.7, SD = 1.1; std. error = .06). While three 
items combine topics—politics and religion—the intent is to give key examples 
of personal matters that often create conflict or disagreements; for example, the 
class line in many families is that two topics are not discussed at the dinner 
table, politics and religion.
Existing Communication Pattern
First, an individual's involvement in a neighborhood communication net-
work was measured using six items. Using the same 0-10 scale (ranging from 
completely disagree to completely agree), respondents told how much they 
agreed or disagreed with each of the following statements: "I often talk with 
neighbors on the street or while I'm in my yard" (M = 6.4, SD = 3.2); "I spend 
more time talking with my neighbors than most people do" (M = 4.4, SD = 3.2); 
"Outside my house or walking down the street, I often greet people passing 
by even if they are not neighbors that I recognize" (M = 7.4, SD = 3.0); "I often 
hear about community problems by word-of-mouth in my neighborhood" 
(M = 5.5, SD = 3.2) Two additional items focused on mass communication in 
their community. Using the same 0-10 scale, respondents agreed or disagreed 
with this statement: "I learn about community activities and problems from 
the community newspaper" (M = 6.1, SD = 3.4) Respondents then were asked 
if there was a community or neighborhood newspaper that covers the place 
where they live and how often they read it (coded so 5=all the time; 4=most
of the time; 3=sometimes; 2=seldom; l=almost never; 0=ls no paper) (M = 3.2, 
SD = 1.8). Responses were standardized and summed up for a Neighborhood 
Communication scale (X = .74).
Traditional items ascertained how many days in the past week respondents 
had read a newspaper (M = 3.8, SD = 2.8; scale = no. days read paper last week), 
how often they watch television news (M = 4.3, SD = 1.8; on scale where 0 = 
never to 6 = several times a day), how often they go on the Internet at home or 
work (M = 3.0, SD = 2.0; scale where 0 = never to 6 = several times per day) and 
how often they visit media websites (M = 1.8, SD = 1.6; scale where 0 = never 
to 6 = several times per day).
A va ilab ility  o f Third Places fo r Conversations
Respondents received open-ended probes to identify third places where 
residents would likely engage in communication: "What are the opportunities 
for communication in public places in your neighborhood, for example, places 
where people might chat informally or where friends and neighbors might go for 
a conversation?" Follow up probes ("any others?") continued until there were 
no more answers. There are diverse ways to combine the categories to reflect 
dimensions Oldenburg33 says characterize third places. Coders tallied mentions 
of coffee shops, bars/pubs and restaurants/ cafes into a category representing 
these dimensions (neutral ground, open to all strata, conversation is the main 
activity, they're accessible except for some monetary barrier and the atmosphere 
is comfortable); such venues are probably one of the most popular forms of 
leisure-time activity in which people engage today and require no coordination 
with others, for the most part (M = .30, SD = .56). A second category has many 
of the same ingredients but focuses on organized social activity—combining 
clubs / organizations, community centers / meetings and senior centers (M = .23, 
SD = .45; this is the category most relevant for Putnam's34 emphasis on organi-
zational involvement; this was labeled "Organized Activity." A third category 
stresses the neighborhood—outside in the neighborhood, in neighbor's homes, 
or at neighborhood parties (M = .19, SD = .43).
Findings
P olitica l discussion was posited to be inversely re lated to com m unity diversity (H1) 
and population (H2).
Community age diversity was negatively related to the global measure of 
involvement in political discussion (r = -.12, p<.04) and network size (r=-.14, 
pc.Ol). Also, community education diversity was positively correlated with 
discussion frequency (r=.ll, p<.05) but not the global measure, network size or 
diversity. This leaves HI with partial support. There was no such relationship 
with population, leaving H2 without support.
H3 posited that one s com fort with the communication clim ate would affect peop le ’s
politica l discussion, and results indicate positive correlations between perceptions 
one would feel comfortable voicing complaints at a public meeting and involvement 
in the politica l discussion network ( r=  .38, p<.001) as well as frequency (r=.37, 
p<.001), size (r=.28, p<.001) and diversity (r=.31, p<.001).
Also, perception that public officials are receptive to citizen views is corre-
lated with the global measure of involvement in a political discussion network 
(r = .14, p<.005) and frequency (r=.16, pc.OOl) but not size or diversity. Feeling 
comfortable striking up a conversation with strangers on the street is correlated 
with the global measure (r = .28, pc.OOl), frequency (r=.26, pc.OOl), size (r=.23, 
pc.OOl) and diversity (r=.19, pc.OOl). Feeling comfortable talking about politics, 
religion or other personal matters with neighbors was positively correlated with 
the global measure of involvement in the political discussion network (r = .49, 
pc.OOl), frequency (r=.46, pc.OOl), size (r=.41, pc.OOl) and diversity (r=.35, 
pc.OOl). Feeling comfortable talking about such matters with coworkers is 
correlated with the global measure (r = .23, pc.OOl), frequency (r=.19, pc.OOl), 
size (r=.22, pc.OOl) and diversity (r=.18, pc.OOl). H3 is thus supported, as the 
communication climate stretching across contexts is a positive factor for the 
size, frequency and diversity of one's political discussion network.
H4 said that people’s existing level of communication activity would affect their 
politica l discussion.
Again, findings reveal positive relationships between the involvement in 
the neighborhood communication network and the global measure of involve-
ment in a political communication network (r = .31, pc.OOl), frequency (r=.33, 
pc.OOl), size (r=.19, pc.OOl) and diversity (r=.17, pc.OOl). Hours one listened 
to the radio yesterday was correlated with the global measure (r = .12, pc.02), 
frequency (r=.13, pc.01) and size (r=.10, pc.05) but not diversity. The number of 
days one read a newspaper the previous week was related to all four measures: 
global measure of involvement (r = .26, pc.OOl), frequency (r=.26, pc.OOl), size 
(r=.20, pc.OOl) and diversity (r=.15, pc.OOl). How often one went on the Inter-
net at home or at work is correlated with the global measure (r = .23, pc.OOl), 
discussion frequency (r=.19, pc.OOl), size (r=.22, pc.OOl) and diversity (r=.19, 
pc.OOl). The frequency with which one visits media websites also was correlated 
with all four measures: global involvement in political discussion network (r = 
.24, pc.OOl), frequency (r=.19, pc.OOl), size (r=.22, pc.OOl) and diversity (r=.19, 
pc.OOl). Clearly, existing communication patterns set the table for political 
discussions, providing support for H4.
H5 returns to the notion of the bu ilt or constructed environment as a facilitator of 
politica l discussion.
A  negative correlation was uncoverd between people's claims that their 
community provided no third places where people might go to chat infor-
mally or where friends and neighbors might go for a conversation and all four 
measures of political discussion: global involvement in a political discussion
network (r = -.20, pc.OOl), frequency (r=-.17, pc.OOl), size (r=-.19, p<.001) and 
diversity (r=-.10, p<.05). Put another way, these links between the availability 
of third places and discussion provide support for H5.
S im ila r ly , H 6  p o s ite d  th a t e d u c a tio n  w o u ld  p o s it iv e ly  in flu e n c e  p o l it ic a l d is c u s s io n .
Findings suggest that education is positively related to all four variables: 
involvement in political discussion network (r=.25, pc.OOl), frequency (r=.22, 
pc.OOl), size (r=.23, pc.OOl) and diversity (r=.22, pc.OOl). This provides support 
for the hypothesis. Male gender is likewise correlated with the global measure 
of involvement in political discussion network (r=.25, pc.OOl) as well as the 
constituent parts, frequency (r=.17, pc.OOl), size (r=.25, pc.OOl) and diversity 
(r=.18, pc.OOl). This provides support for H7. Age is positively correlated with 
frequency (r=.ll, pc.05) but not the global measure, size or diversity. This leaves 
H8 with only weak support. As for RQ1, no relationship was found between 
marital status and political discussion.
The relative importance of the variables was examined using forward 
stepwise regression, with all of the five blocks of predictors eligible for entry: 
social categories; community / environmental; perceived communication climate; 
existing communication pattern; availability of third places for conversations.
Regressions were conducted for the global measure of involvement in a 
political discussion network, as well as its three constituent components— 
frequency of discussing politics, size of political discussion network and di-
versity of political discussion network. A similar pattern emerges across the 
four regressions, with comfort talking about personal matters with neighbors 
(P=.41) and discussing complaints at public meetings (p=.24) appearing as the 
most important predictors of the global measure of involvement in a political 
discussion network. Following these predictors in terms of importance are: 
frequency of visiting media websites (P=.ll) and involvement in a neighbor-
hood communication network (p=.16). The social category most important is 
gender (being male; (p=—.19).
The availability of "third places" for conversations (P=.12) appears as one 
of the last significant predictors for the global measure of involvement. Read-
ing the newspaper more frequently (p=.12) appears to impact the size of one's 
political discussion network but not size or diversity, while education (p=. 10) 
and the availability of organizational opportunities for conversation (p=.09) only 
enhance the diversity of one's political discussion network. While the relative 
significance of predictors shifts when new ones are entered, the coefficients 
don't change dramatically.
D iscuss ion
On balance, study findings suggest that the social categories of respondents 
and community characteristics affect our political discussion networks and 
these dynamics mirror those found in past work.35 Thus, the more educated,
males and older people have larger, more active and diverse political discussion 
networks. Political discussion is greater in communities with more educational 
but less ethnic or age diversity. So while ethnic and age diversity in a commu-
nity increase the probability one will encounter people who don't share those 
characteristics, they don't lead to more political discussion.
But what is particularly striking about the results is the cumulative impact of 
more stable and routine communication phenomena on citizens' political discus-
sion networks. With social categories and community diversity controlled, the 
frequency with which one discusses political issues, the size of the discussion 
circle and the likelihood one will actually engage people with different political 
views is enhanced if people feel comfortable speaking out in public meetings 
and feel comfortable talking about such personal matters with neighbors. One's 
political network is enhanced if further they're involved in a stronger neighbor-
hood communication network and use both traditional media—reading daily 
newspapers more often—as well as the Internet (visiting media websites) more 
frequently. Yet the influence of the Internet is only modest here, which confirms 
Papacharissi's36 contention that online media provide a public forum, but not 
a public sphere. And, finally, the community itself has an impact if it is seen as 
providing places for such conversations to occur.
Growing diversity should lead people to encounter those unlike themselves, 
but the fact there's a negative relationship with the size, frequency and diversity 
of one's political discussion network suggests that people avoid what they see 
as potential conflict. This finding is consistent with past work in that domain, 
as well as related contexts involving the Spiral of Silence.37 Communities and 
their leaders should thus strive for the development of civil communication 
norms that are advertised, promoted and celebrated in the face of diversity, 
because the next block shows that political discussion is enhanced when people 
feel comfortable talking about such political or civil matters in public settings.
The continuing importance of neighborhoods as they impact communities is 
underlined by the variance explained in the regression. Those who are involved 
in strong neighborhood communication networks also are more involved in 
political discussions. This doesn't mean that work and family networks aren't 
important, but one shouldn't ignore neighborhoods as units of analysis and 
venues for programs and actions. Generally, the discussion over what built or 
communication environment factors might enhance Habermas'38 vision of a ro-
bust public sphere needs to be grounded in a wider consideration of these issues.
Although third places provide necessary conditions for creating a public 
sphere, they do not automatically lead to its emergence. Environmental fac-
tors of such third places remain rather secondary as determinants of political 
behaviors in relation to primary family or workplace influences. Putnam, 
Habermas and others see newspapers and other traditional media stifling this 
collective collaboration in favor of one where one-way channels inform public 
opinion—with little opportunity for feedback—and reducing the need for in-
terpersonal interaction. The fact that Internet use predicts political discussion
activity—at least modestly-suggests that it can play a role as a virtual sphere 
of public debate, one that benefits from the convergence of mass and interper-
sonal modalities. 39 Still, if emerging physical and virtual third places only lead 
to isolated discussions and special interest forums, then Habermas' vision of 
shared public discourse may continue to elude.
Lastly, city planners and neighborhood leaders need to support the devel-
opment of third places for conversations in their communities. What's optimal 
for the community will depend on the pattern of residents, their ethnic mix, 
generational preferences and economic resources. Since the present study scope 
is limited to a domestic snapshot, more research is needed on what types of 
third places increase the likelihood that people from diverse backgrounds will 
encounter and engage each other in political conversations. The common ground 
of parks and community centers themselves require more "micro strategies" as 
architects and planners learn the connection between communication, public 
involvement and the built or constructed environment. Furthermore, while this 
research captures a national picture of urban areas in the United States, with its 
diverse culture, similar studies might profitably address other countries and 
other cultures.
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